Introduction 1
The 'Fifth International Congress of Onomastic Sciences', dedicated to the study of proper names, gathered in the Castillan city of Salamanca in 1955. A year later, the young historian Halil Inalcık, who had represented the Turkish Historical Society at this congress, published a report in the Society's Review (Türk Tarih Kurumu Belleten) , in which he recommended to Turkish historians the discipline of onomastics as a highly relevant and hitherto neglected field of historical inquiry. Having defined the field of onomastics as the science dealing with toponymy, 'the archaeology of names' and anthroponymy 'the social psychology of personal names', he outlined the historiographic importance of the field: 'Place and personal names are living documents, which preserve the ethnic, social and linguistic influences of the 'longue durée' (Inalcık 1956: 223) . Interestingly, Inalcık's article appears to be oblivious to the fact that it was published in a country, whose state agencies had already spent considerable effort to change both its toponymy and the personal names of its citizens, and by an institution that had chosen to support this policy with benign neglect. What is more, the little of this 'archaeology' that had survived the avid gaze of zealous bureaucrats, was about to be destroyed just a year later with the launch of the 'Expert Commission for Name Change', which would, once and for all, do away with the diverse toponymical heritage of the Ottoman lands.
[2] This paper aims at reconstructing the re-naming of the entirety of a country's geography and topography as the state-directed policy of 'toponymical engineering', discussed here as a policy in close causal relationship with 'demographic' and 'social engineering'. It does so in three steps. First, it refers to two interrelated debates: the current shift from national to post-national historiographies in South East Europe and Turkey that has re-oriented the focus of inquiry from the Kemalist reforms towards the often traumatic workings of the early Republic and the related conceptual opening that has introduced demographic engineering and ethnic cleansing as novel analytical tools. In the second part, it examines the empirical case of toponymical engineering between 1915 and the 1990s by differentiating four waves of administrative measures geared towards the Turkification of place names and by highlighting the semi-autonomous role of bureaucratic elites. Often to the dismay of elected representatives 1 The author would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their constructive criticism and their insightful comments, Alexandre Toumarkine and Nicholas Sigalas for their support during the editing process and, finally, Doreen Gerritzen from the Journal Onoma for her academic generosity extended at a much earlier stage of this paper. 'The Nation's Imprint: Demographic Engineering and the Change of Toponymes in Republican Turkey ', European Journal of Turkish Studies, Thematic Issue N° 7, No. 7 | Demographic Engineeringpart I, URL: http://www.ejts.org/document2243.html To quote a passage, use paragraph ( §) and more forcefully during periods of military intervention and caretaker governments, bureaucrats would advance the toponymic agenda. In the conclusion, the paper addresses the question whether demographic engineering is indeed a meaningful analytical tool for the debate of the issues considered in this volume, a question that will be answered with a qualified yes.
[3] The empirical evidence of this paper rests on documents seen in the Republican 
I Post-nationalist perspectives and demographic engineering
[4] Critical studies of nations and nationalism in general and South East Europe in particular have often focused on the social construction of nations, the delimitation of their territories and the emergence of clearly delimited nation-states. More often than not, however, these studies have failed to expose the 'dark side of nationalism' and the destructive antecedents of the modern nation-state. This could be deemed surprising insofar as, for the region under study, the historical sequence and the mutual constitution of the two trajectories,
i.e. genocide, ethnic cleansing or population exchange as the antecedent to the social construction of nations and nation-states are quite evident. In South East Europe, within which a discussion of Turkey's nation-state project appears most appropriate, however, the ontological relationship between the two has been obscured by a couple of interrelated factors: National historiographies, until recently dominated by orthodox and nationalist narratives, are by default devised to drive a wedge between the nation's undesired recent past of foreign domination on one side and the dual time perspective of an ideal present and a mythical distant past on the other.
[5] Consequently, the focus of inquiry used to be on the processes of state and nationbuilding after the 'liberation' from imperial 'hegemons' such as the Ottoman or Habsburg empires. In these national narratives, history begins with independence and is posited against two historical time-scales characterised by dichotomic values on the axes of proximity and desirability. The distant past is imagined yet adored, while the immediate past is in the reach of memory, yet abhorred. Nation-builders in Greece created the basis of modern Greek identity by (Brown 1996; Todorova 1997 [6] Such 'nationalising historiographies' (Smith 1998: 20) , 2 by definition, reduce the immediate past preceding the establishment of the nation-state to the struggle of national 'heroes' against the hegemonic system of oppression. Groups with competing claims over the same territory are vilified or ignored, never respected and almost always dehumanised. This approach, institutionalised in history institutes and universities, school and textbooks has its own methodology, sources and documents, which all aim at creating and rendering hegemonic a unified version of national history. In this respect, nationalising historiographies, together with nationalising cultural policies such as the naming of a given territory, could be described as the constructive dimension of nation-states. Such strategies, however, would be meaningless without the destructive antecedent that creates the required tabula rasa or at least, subjects and dis-empowers undesired ethno-religious communities.
[7] The recent decentring of national historiographies indeed breaks with this historiographical perspective as it makes possible the shift towards transnational perspectives, and a post-nationalist subject position 3 allows for a thorough reconsideration of historiography and identity: Rather than concentrating exclusively on the history of the nation-state and its construction, questions regarding the moments of transition gain importance. What happened in the transition between pre-modern empire and nation-state? Under what conditions were heterogeneous spaces transformed into homogenous territories? The refocusing on the 'prehistory' of nations, then, brings to the fore policies of destruction rather than construction.
[8] A growing body of literature highlights the role of ethnic cleansing in the making of modern Europe, in particular during the transition from empire to nation-state. The authors of 2 'Nationalising historiographies' are 'mythic narratives, including myths or origin and descent which serve as a means of legitimising current boundaries of homeland in the face of counter-narratives by 'others', who question the legitimacy of such myths of national destiny and who are themselves engaged in putting forward alternative interpretations of their place within the borderlands' (Smith 1998: 20) . 3 A post-nationalist subject position here refers to the position of the scholar operating from a postnationalist set of institutions and legal arrangements, i.e. the European Union. [10] Probably the most recent addition to the vocabulary is the concept 'demographic engineering'. The question why yet another concept should be introduced into a scholarly field that already abounds with different theoretical approaches is justified. Does the literature of political mass violence, ethnic cleansing and genocide not explain it all, as many authors specialising on the latter would suggest? 4 Or, does this new concept, originating from studies of demography and migration, deflect, once again, from the destruction and suffering of the victims and re-establishes the focus on the constructive efforts of the nation state?
[11] Much of the cited literature on the destructive precedent to the nation-state does indeed stop with the completion of such policies. In the field of genocide studies for instance, the primary concern lies with the planning, unfolding and realisation of genocide, not so much with the question how it ties into larger questions of national identity and nation-building (Levene 1998; Weitz 2003) . It is in this context that the conceptual turn to demographic engineering might open up new avenues for research, which might be particularly insightful for South East
Europe and the Ottoman/Turkish case (cf. also Table 1 ).
4 It is by now a truism to state that the debate on the genocidal killings of Ottoman Armenians in 1915 has been dominated and to a certain extent hijacked by a fixation on the naming of the event. In the field of genocide studies, this can be explained with the prominence given to normative and ethical arguments that sometimes go together uneasily with analytical and historical approaches. removing the minority form the territory in question' (McGarry 1998: 630) . In an even more inclusive definition, Seker adds to this all state programmes and policies, 'which aim to increase the political and economic power of one ethnic group over others' (Seker 2007: 461 (Bumin 2007; Yalçın 2007) . 6 During periods of national consolidation in the 1920s and 30s, such strategies have been at the core of government policies in most countries in South East Europe, and especially Greece and Bulgaria (Hart 1999: 204) . In Bulgaria, two thirds of all Turkish place names and settlements were changed by ministerial orders in 1934 alone (Mahon 1999: 154) . Several waves of name change campaigns targeting both place and personal names with Non-Bulgarian etymology continued until the end of Communism (Hacısalihoğlu 2008: 146-152 should be obsessed with changing the markers of communities, which they wish to forget, i.e. their toponymes, but also their anthroponymes. Probably not surprising either is that very little effort has been made so far to explore these prime examples of nationalising policies, with the notable exception, in the Turkish case, of Samim Akgönül's extensive work on the politics of place and personal names (Akgönül 2006) [17] The state policies targeting this diverse toponymical heritage, I shall call 'toponymical engineering' due to its conceptual proximity to demographic engineering, with which it often, if not always goes hand in hand. Its main objective is the destruction of the interwoven layers of historical and linguistic meaning, i.e. of the 'archaeology' of place names and its replacement with an alternative toponymical order that conforms with the time and space vision of the nation-state.
II. Four waves of name change from 1915 to the 1990s
[18] Turkey's toponymical destruction/construction is closely related to the emptying of its territory and its re-population. Yet, with its hybrid identity as a destructive/constructive policy, state agencies have not ceased to enforce it throughout the entire republican history of Turkey. I shall look into four waves of name changes and two significant overlaps of instances of demographic and toponymical engineering. 8 The first wave overlaps with the decade of demographic engineering preceding and leading to the foundation of the Turkish Republic, the second covers the period of one-party rule, while the third resonates with the operations of the Expert Commission for name change ' (1950-1980s) . Finally, the last section discusses the second overlap of demographic and toponymical engineering: the 'Symposium of Turkish Toponymes' in the 1980s and the eviction of hundreds of thousands of Kurds in the country's South East.
The first overlap: Demographic engineering and toponymical change 1915-1922
[19] When the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) declared the deportation law for 'those opposing the government in times of war' on 27 May 1915, more than a million Armenians, Syriac Christians, and some Kurdish communities were forced into exile and destruction. In only a few weeks, the government initiated the name change of evacuated villages (Dündar 2001: 65) . At the same time, some of these villages were swiftly resettled with Muslim refugees, pouring into the country from the Balkans and the easternmost provinces under Russian occupation. In a directive, the Chief of the General Staff and one of the three leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), Enver Pasha, declared that:
[20] 'It has been decided that provinces, districts, towns, villages, mountains and rivers, which are named in languages belonging to non-Muslim nations such as Armenian, Greek or Bulgarian, will be transformed into Turkish. [21] This initial attempt of re-naming proved to be short-lasted, as the re-naming during times of warfare threatened to impede military communications. Yet, local military commanders continued a policy of fait accompli in most provinces regained from the Greek army and replaced toponymes that had a Greek or Slavic etymology. A body of correspondence between ministries, the Ankara government and the Office of the General
Command from 1921 exposes the tension between hardened commanders on the ground who wanted to efface immediately the memory of 'the enemy' from the territory they had just liberated and government representatives who were thinking in terms of a long-term 'scientific solution'.
[22] After the expulsion of Greek troops from Western Anatolia, the Chief of the General Staff replied to a circular from the Interior Ministry, accepting the need for changing place names in principle, yet advising against imprudent decisions:
[23] 'It is made known that the change of some village and town names, which are named with foreign names will be delayed until the demobilisation of troops, because a part of the population of these villages and towns is now mobilised, and the change would cause disruptions to communications and intelligence. Especially the national feelings of the population of the western provinces, which has suffered from the atrocities and aggressions of the Greeks and the local Rum is now too vehement to name and refer to their places of origin with foreign names. Therefore, Sir, I submit and suggest forcefully that it will be attempted immediately and swiftly to change these' (translated from BCA 030.10/66.439.21 25/6/1923 [correspondence mostly from 1921]).
The Interior Minister agreed, yet insisted on a 'scientific examination':
[24] 'As the details of changing of village and town names is a matter, which has to be examined scientifically, taking into account the historical circumstances and the geographical works, and the change of geographical names would require the historical registers […] the following registers, which contain the village and town names in the western provinces, which the Glorious President of the General Staff deemed necessary to be changed […] [25] Although the quest for a systematic renaming remained inconclusive after the Minister of Education, Ziya Gökalp, stalled the process, quite a few members of the nascent Parliament in Ankara urged a complete and immediate change of place names (Koraltürk 2003: 98) . Many place names were nevertheless changed after long and emotive debates in the Parliament, 9 mostly in line with the pragmatic position of the Interior Ministry 'to change the Öktem ) [28] The 'Law on the Adoption and Application of Turkish letters' (Türk Harflerinin Kabul ve Tatbiki Kanunu) promulgated by the Parliament in Ankara in the same year outlawed Arabic script in all official and private documents (Heyd 1954: 22) . It opened the way for a complete revision of all media, including maps and place-name directories, which were to be published in [30] Renaming efforts continued throughout these years, stretching from the urban toponymy to the meta-level of regional names. In 1927, all street and square names in Istanbul, which were not of Turkish origin, were replaced (Okutan 2004: 182) . During the heyday of Kemalist one-party rule, citizens petitioned the General Secretary of the Republican People's Party, now intertwined with the Interior Ministry, to rename the capital Ankara as Gaziyuva (Nest of the Ghazi). 14 12 The 'Society for the study of Turkish history' (Türk Tarihi Tetkik Cemiyeti) was later re-named as the 'Turkish Historical Society' (Türk Tarih Kurumu). 13 The general nationalist atmosphere of the time and the fervour with which the 'Turkification of Turkish' was received was by no means only a 'racial purification' in the realm of language and ideology, as the appearance of the slogan 'Citizen. Speak Turkish!' (Vatandaş, Türkçe Konuş!) in the streets of at that time still multi-cultural and multi-lingual Istanbul suggests. Heyd cites a letter from the students of the Istanbul University and the Galatasaray High-school to the Turkish Language Society in 1933, which conveys the atmosphere of the time: 'Even the most uncouth Turkish word is to us more pleasing than the most harmonious foreign word' (Heyd 1954: 30) . 14 The petitions came from primary school children, citizens and civil servants. Among them were suggestions to rename Ankara as Atatürk Kent (Atatürk city), Gazi Mustafa Kemal (Ghazi Mustafa Kemal), Gaziyuva (Nest of the Ghazi) (BCA 490.01/502.2018 (BCA 490.01/502. .1 1933 (BCA 490.01/502. -1936 [39] Yet, the process was decelerated further by a lack of support for the name-change strategy on the side of the government. While the Democrat Party (DP) made no overt effort to forestall the work of the Commission, it could be suggested that its conservative elites, known for their desire to revert the language reform, were not as fervently committed to the Turkification of toponymes, and certainly all but enthusiastic of its secularist tendencies. Soon, however, the Commission was to find a more favourable environment for its proceedings: After the military coup of 27 May 1960, and despite the swift re-introduction of multi-party politics in the following year, the principles of the language reform and the renaming policy were reinforced by the military-appointed care-taker government. A circular of this government was communicated to all ministries in January 1961, outlawing the 'use of any foreign word for which a Turkish equivalent existed' (Lewis 1999: 157) .
[40] The Commission assembled throughout the 1960s, and presented the outcome in the new edition of 'Our Villages' in 1968 (Köylerimiz) (IIB 1968) . The directory introduced more than 12,000 toponymes, replacing approximately thirty percent of the 45,000 village names in Turkey (cf. Table 2 for an exemplary change of district names in the province of Urfa). 1933 , 1940 and 1948 (DV 1933a DV 1940; DV 1948) , the Provincial Yearbook of Urfa (Urfa Valiligi [Urfa Governorate] 1967), (Rousseau 1825) and (Kiepert 1884) .
The term merkez (centre) signifies the administrative centre of the province, the district or the sub-district, as each administrative unit is named after the administrative centre.
[41] A general reform of the state administration after the coup d'Etat in 1971 instigated a re-organisation of the General Directory for Provincial Administration. A new office, the 'fifth branch' (Beşinci Şube), was established for [42] [T]he printing and dissemination of maps, the incorporation of changes in city limits into existing maps; the ongoing reporting of the Expert Commission for Name Changes; the preparation of annual province reports (İl Yıllığı) and the implementation of tasks pertaining to administrative geography; the publication of reports; and the execution of the Development Plan, the annual programs and the implementation plans (translated from http://www.icisleri.gov.tr).
[43] Although the Expert Commission had become defunct after the completion of the Based on the alphabetical list of provinces in Emiroglu (Emiroglu 1984: 198f.) , and the directory 'Divisions of Home Rule 1978'. Only provinces with a proportion of new village names over 30% are shown.
[45] Around the same time, the Directorate distributed the directory 'New natural place [48] Aksan himself was referring to data published in the 'Bulletin for Turkish Language
Studies' (Baskan 1970) , which drew on the 1968 edition of 'Our Villages'. As I have shown earlier, this directory had listed more than 12,000 new village names. Based on these directories -produced by civil servants with the intent to replace ostensibly non-Turkish place names with Turkish substitutes evoking a Central Asian heritage -the self-declared 'onomasts' now proved that Turkish place names appeared to be coherent with toponymes in Central Asia.
Despite this highly unethical research agenda, however, little criticism seems to have been expressed against the name change campaign in the 1960s and 70s, be it in academic publications or in the general media. The few critical voices mourned the loss of originally Turkish place names, which the members of the Commission had mistaken for 'foreign' toponymes, and hence had changed (Soylu 1972: 6239) . 20 [49] To recapitulate, the period between the 1950s and 1980s hosts the most momentous changes to Turkey's toponymy, with the grip of the Commission getting ever tighter and reaching out ever further, into hamlets, alms, pastures, mountains and rivers. A new pattern also emerges: Democratically elected governments even if they do not always stop the practice of renaming, are remarkably less inclined to support and facilitate the Commission's work.
Considered in this light, the Turkification of Turkey's time and space emerges as a policy of bureaucratic elites that lingered on during democratic periods and was imbued with renewed vehemence during the interludes of military rule. 20 Soylu demonstrated, on the example of a village in the province of İçel, how the name change had led to the loss of a six-hundred year old history going back to the landlord 'Hocenti Bey' of the principality of the Karaman. The Commission members mistook Hocenti for an Armenian name, which they substituted with the Turkish, yet ill-placed 'Derinçay' (Deep Brook) (Soylu 1972: 6239) . [52] a) Names that are not Turkish, whose pronunciation and structure is incompatible with the vocal harmony of Turkish, which might be confused due to similar pronunciation and which do not have a pleasant meaning and are contrary to the common sense of the people shall be changed.
b) Names, which are Turkish, yet corrupted by local dialects, shall be restored according to the correct orthography.
c) Foreign place names shall not be substituted by their translation into Turkish.
However, if the old name refers to a natural or topographic characteristic of the village, a (Gökçeer 1984: 4) .
[53] The president introduced two new principles: The first was the beautification of 'unpleasant names', already part of earlier practices, and the second a clear reminder that the translation of toponymes would help reconstituting the history of a place and should therefore be shunned. The latter implies a hardening of the toponymic policy, which had tolerated translations in earlier phases.
[54] The director of the Cartographic Office of the Ordnance Command (Harita Genel Komutanlığı, Kartografya Şubesi) relayed the current view of the country as beleaguered by external and internal enemies, when he outlined a further goal for the Commission unmentioned by Gökçeer:
[55] 'To intervene in international institutions, in order to correct dangerous statements in the foreign press, which claim the existence of foreign place names in Turkey[…] To correct internal publications, which do not comply with the Turkish [History] Thesis and to ensure their convergence' (Orcan 1984: 60) . swiftly', in order to forestall those 'who argue that toponymes stemming from the Anatolian civilisation should not be altered' (Tan 1984: 279) . His justification of renaming was a prime example of the 'Turkish-Islamic synthesis' in progress, which was to shape Turkey's ideological landscape for almost two decades:
[57] 'The state of the Republic of Turkey is a state founded by the Turkish nation under her great leader Atatürk. It is inconceivable that the lands considered as homeland by this state founded with the blood of hundreds and thousands of martyrs should abound with foreign place names' (translated from Tan 1984: 280) .
[58] Tan's concession that it is not the people but the state that considers the lands of (Tan 1984: 282) .
[60] One of the few critical voices at the Symposium was an academic from the University of the Euphrates in Elazığ in Southeast Turkey. He did not, as many others, justify his critique with the undesirable fact that toponymes of Turkish origin had also been subjected to the pedantry of the Commission. He rather drew attention to the problems, which the escalating process would cause for studies in the field of historical geography, and delivered a remarkable plea against this final renaming frenzy:
[61] 'The Commission has continuously and repeatedly changed the names of villages, train stations, gendarmerie posts, lighthouses, capes and bays. Yet it seems to be unimaginable that names of locales (Mevkii adları) could be changed with such ease, as these names have become a property of the people and a reflection of their material culture' (translated from Karaboran 1984: 144) .
[62] Was Karaboran aware of the fact that Nail Tan was alluding precisely to these hamlets and locales of Kurdish and other linguistic enclaves, when he recommended that 'the efforts towards the changing of toponymes of non-Turkish or non-Turkified form should be completed swiftly'? With the legitimacy of the 'scholarly' Symposium in Ankara and a 22 Tan's concern that the name change was not taking hold even in government offices might have been true to an extent. He himself refers to an example from Rize (the former Sancak of Lazistan, with a sizeable portion of Armenian (Hemşin) and Greek toponyms): 'Our team went to Rize for research, yet had to return in grief, having encountered old maps full of Greek place names in state offices' (Tan 1984: 282 
III. Concluding perspectives
[63] Riding on the high-tide of ethnic purism, Balkan governments changed the names of their towns, villages and districts, particularly in the interwar years (Hart 1999; Mahon 1999) . [64] The most striking insight, which we can gain from this history, is the role of the bureaucratic apparatus in the execution of the toponymical policy. Debates in the Turkish Grand National Assembly on the issue have been emotional at times and often contested. And indeed, early republican governments and administrators appeared overhasty in their zeal to purge the country of every reminder of the expelled Christian communities and thereby to prove their 23 In the meantime, legal changes to facilitate the campaign were introduced. The 'Law on the organization and tasks of the Interior Ministry', passed just a year later, reiterated the role of the Directorate in streamlining the provincial administration. The role of the Directorate, among others, was to execute the procedures with respect to establishing or abrogating local government units; changing limits and names; splitting or merging administrative units; the name change of villages, places of importance and natural place names; to publish reports on the administration. ( § 9, Art. 2, in http://www.icisleri.gov.tr). This law was remarkable, however, as it clearly reacted to the increasing conflict in the Southeast. It explicitly referred to the 'village guards' (köy korucuları), who were employed by the state in order to crush the Kurdish insurgency. 24 In the following decade of military conflict and emergency rule, during which the provinces of the Southeast were subjected to martial law, more than 3,000 villages and hamlets were evacuated, burned or destroyed, either by state security forces or the PKK militia. [65] The recurring waves of toponymical engineering were exceptionally destructive, as
they successfully submerged what İnalcık called the 'archaeology' of the longue durée. In its constructive dimension, the policy led to the emergence of a Turkified toponymical order, which, however, is bereft of historical depth, symbolic meaning or emotional appeal. In fact, it would be fair to state that Turkey's contemporary toponymical order with the exception of larger towns and cities is devoid of meaning per se, characterised by 'dead documents that obfuscate the ethnic, social and linguistic influences of the 'longue durée', to rephrase Inalcik. Hence, even in its constructive dimension, it is the lacklustre imagination of bureaucrats that has acted as godfather for the new toponymical order. The consequence is a sterile, factually misleading and intellectually disappointing repetition of a limited number of beautified place names that do not correspond to the topographical, historical or linguistic structures they denominate. In this sense, the Republic's virtually clandestine toponymical project did not redeem the older, imperial web of meanings with a new one. It destroyed the meanings of the former, obfuscated historical connections and ethno-religious patterns, but failed to replace it with an alternative sense of meaning.
[66] Indeed, there is now an official and almost exclusively Turkish order of place names in maps, newspapers, school books and public correspondence that has replaced and obfuscated the archaeology of the 'ethnic, social and linguistic influences of the longue durée, which Halil İnalcık so passionately praised after his visit to the Congress of Onomastic Sciences in Salamanca. More than fifty years later, the knowledge of the old place names has largely dissipated. And so has the sense of societal awareness of diversity and multicultural sociability. 25 To some extent, reminders of the pre-national order survive: Residents know the 25 Renee Hirschon discusses this loss of the common ground between the peoples of the Ottoman Empire and its impact on contemporary identities with a reference to Greece and Turkey (Hirschon Öktem, Kerem (2008) [67] Thanks to an ironic twist, however, the old toponymic order lives on in the archives of the Republic. As the naming of places was primarily a bureaucratic endeavour, the old toponymes are well documented and available as official documents with the seal of the Interior
Ministry. This wealth of available documents, hence, also stakes out future research agendas.
Re-establishing the etymology of human settlements and the historical, linguistic, religious and ethnic legacies they engender will become an indispensable aspect of the already growing field of local histories in Turkey. The recovery of old place names will also help to reconnect these local histories to Greek, Armenian and Syriac memories, hence re-establish the destroyed continuity the late-Ottoman notion of time and space. Beyond the sphere of local history, I would hope that some of the issues raised in this paper, especially the question of local and national actors and the specific workings of the Expert Commission for Name Change will be revisited in the framework of fresh research. Who were the members of the Commission, how did they work and what did they think about their mission? When, if not now should we take the scholarly content of Onomastic research seriously and use its possibilities for a post-national reconsideration of Turkey's multiple, if denied legacies.
Conceptual deliberations
[68] On the conceptual side, I have tried to show that the analytical tool of demographic engineering can be used to push the debate further towards acknowledging and exploring the ontological relationship between destruction ex ante and discriminatory construction from a social-constructivist and integrative perspective.
[69] Despite the new insights, which the demographic engineering approach may bring, however, it should not be taken as an easy way out of the contested and polarised debate on the destructive content of transitional periods between imperial dissolution and national 'reemergence'. A whole set of constraints needs to be taken into account. 
